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Abstract  
In this article, I consider how recent work on the philosophy of group-agency and shared-agency 
can help us to understand what it is for a church to act in worship. I argue that to assess a 
model’s suitability for providing such an account, we must consider how well it handles cases of 
non-paradigm participants, such as those with ASD and young infants. I suggest that whilst a 
shared-agency model helps to clarify how individuals coordinate actions in cases of reading or 
singing liturgy, it does not handle non-paradigm cases well and so cannot be considered a 
suitable model of group liturgical action. Instead, I suggest that a model of group-agency, in 
which a plurality of action types can contribute to the actions of a group as a whole, is better 
suited to explaining a church’s actions in worship.  
 
Introduction 
Every week, in churches all over the world, congregations thank God together, confess their sins 
together, and offer prayers together. Many of the liturgies used in corporate worship use the 
pronoun ‘we’ to signify that the congregation, together, participates in worship. In the Church of 
England’s Common Worship, for instance, the congregation confess their sins together (‘we have 
sinned against you and against our neighbour in thought and word and deed’ Common Worship, 
Holy Communion, Prayers of Penitence)), they thank and praise God together (‘we thank you 
for feeding us with the body and blood of your Son Jesus Christ’ (Common Worship, Holy 
Communion, Prayer After Communion)), and they share in the breaking of bread together 
(‘Though we are many, we are one body, because we all share in one bread’ (Common Worship, 
Holy Communion, Breaking of the Bread)). Liturgical worship is an importantly corporate 
activity.1  
Indeed, many theological writers have been keen to stress that it is not the individual 
members of churches who worship God, but, rather, it is the assembled group of people who 
                                                 
1 I will use the term ‘liturgical worship’ throughout this paper. As I will use the term, it simply 
refers to any worship which is scripted. As Wolterstorff notes, even in Church traditions in 
which no liturgical texts or spoken forms of liturgy are used, there are scripted actions which the 
congregation performs to engage with God (2015, 9). 
 2 
worship God together as a gathered church. Likewise, when worship is discussed in Scripture, 
the subject is, more often than not, the community of worshippers and not the individual 
worshipper. This understanding of worship provides us with a philosophical problem: How can 
a church which is composed of many individual members be considered an agent in its own 
right?  
To answer this question, I draw from the philosophical literature on group action. It is 
not unusual, in everyday speech, to talk of groups as if they were capable of believing and acting 
in ways irreducible to the actions and beliefs of the individual group members. For example, we 
speak of an orchestra’s elegant performance, of a financial corporation’s greed, and of a 
newspaper’s biased views. The philosophy of group action attempts to make sense of how 
groups, and not just individuals, can be considered agents capable of acting. I argue that there is 
much in this literature which can inform and make sense of how the church can engage in 
worship. 
I outline two models of group liturgical action drawn from this literature to consider how 
we might best account for a church’s actions in worship. The first model draws from shared-
agency accounts (such as that defended by John Searle (1990, 2010)), which seek to explain how 
individual intentions can be coordinated in group action. The second model draws from group-
agency accounts (such as that defended by Christian List and Philip Petit (2010)), which seek to 
explain how a group constituted by individuals could be structured in such a way that it might be 
considered an agent in its own right.  
To establish which model is better suited to understanding a church’s worship, I then 
consider how each model handles non-paradigm participants in worship, such as those with 
ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder) and very young infants. I maintain that the best model for 
understanding the church’s actions in worship will provide an inclusive account of how 
participants can engage in and contribute to the church’s worship. I argue that a group-agency 
model is better suited to giving an account of what it is for a church to act in worship. Whilst a 
shared-agency model can help to explain some kinds of group liturgical action (such as 
coordinated singing and reading of a liturgical script), such an account has its limits since it 
assumes only neuro-typical individuals are engaged in liturgical action and it excludes those who 
do not have the capacity to engage in complex coordinated action. I argue that a model of 
Church action which can account for a pluralistic and inclusive participation in worship is 
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preferable. Since the group-agency model allows for such participation, it should be preferred as 
a model of what it is for a church to act in worship.2 
 
A theological position, a philosophical problem 
To begin with, I will lay out the issues involved, theologically, before considering how 
philosophical work on group action might help us to understand these issues more clearly.  
Throughout Scripture, worship is frequently described in reference to communities and 
groups of individuals, and much less frequently, as an act performed by individuals alone.3 
Indeed, the vast majority of the practices and rituals associated with worship which are described 
in Scripture are not performed by individuals, but, rather, by communities. Dru Johnson (2016), 
in his discussion of ritual epistemology in Scripture, talks of the ‘social process’ (2016, 246) of 
coming to know through such rituals. As Johnson notes, the rituals of Scripture lack the 
individualistic, egalitarian sensibilities of some modern theological thought. That is, the worship 
rituals in the Hebrew Bible do not give an equal role to all participants; Johnson notes that men, 
women, children and priests all had different roles to play in the practice of rituals. The reason 
for this, Johnson argues, is that it is the community that engages in these practices, and not just 
the individual. Thus, he thinks, ‘because different roles in Israelite society will necessarily dispose 
persons to be variously discerning, they must rely upon each other in order to know well’ (2016, 
246).  
 This emphasis on community is not found only in the rituals of the Hebrew Bible, 
however. We can see this emphasis on community in the New Testament, particularly with 
reference to the community of the Christian Church (ekklēsía, literally— ‘called out of’). In 1 
Corinthians, for instance, Paul spends a considerable time resolving issues relating to the 
worship of the early Church. Yet, it is notable that, throughout these discussions, although Paul 
speaks to individuals about their specific role in worship, his concern is to address the 
                                                 
2 As I will argue, this is not to say that a shared-agency model is, therefore, redundant, but just 
that it has its limits.  
3 See: Exodus 3:13, 7:16, 9:1, 33:10; Joshua 22:27; 1 Samuel 1:19; 2 Kings 17:32; 2 Chronicles 7:3, 
29:28-30: Nehemiah 8:6, 9:3; Psalm 55:14, 95:6, 102:22; Jeremiah 26:2; Ezekiel 46:9; Matthew 
2:11, 14:33, 28:17; Luke 1:10, 24:52; John 4:24; Acts 13:2; Romans 12:1; 1 Corinthians 14:26; 
Hebrews 12:28, Revelation 7:11, 11:16, 19:4. 
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community of worshippers.4 We can see this most strikingly as his thought reaches its climax in 
his use of the metaphor of the body of Christ in chapter 12. Paul writes that  
 
the body does not consist of one member but of many. If the foot would say, “Because I 
am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part of 
the body. And if the ear would say, “Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the 
body,” that would not make it any less a part of the body. If the whole body were an eye, 
where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of 
smell be? But as it is, God arranged the members in the body, each one of them, as he 
chose. If all were a single member, where would the body be? As it is, there are many 
members, yet one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, “I have no need of you,” nor 
again the head to the feet, “I have no need of you.” On the contrary, the members of the 
body that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and those members of the body that we 
think less honourable we clothe with greater honour, and our less respectable members 
are treated with greater respect; whereas our more respectable members do not need this. 
But God has so arranged the body, giving the greater honour to the inferior member, 
that there may be no dissension within the body, but the members may have the same 
care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is 
honoured, all rejoice together with it. (1 Corinthians 12:14-26).5 
 
                                                 
4 Note that sometimes the emphasis on the corporate nature of worship in the New Testament is 
overlooked due to the ambiguity of the second-person plural pronoun in English. Take the 
following verse, for instance, ‘Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit’ 
(1 Corinthians 6:19). Read in English, this looks to be addressing the singular second-personal, 
yet, in Greek, the pronoun used is the plural second-person.  
5 This is not the only place in which we find such an analogy. The metaphor of the body and its 
parts is used in a number of places (Colossians 1: 18-20, Colossians 3:12-17, Romans 12:3-8), so 
also is the model of the temple and its bricks (2 Corinthians 6:14-18, 1 Corinthians 6:18-20, 1 
Corinthians 3:10-17), the household and its stones (1 Timothy 3:14-15, Ephesians 2:11-20, 1 
Peter 2:3-8), the field and its workers (1 Corinthians 3:5-9), and a nation and its citizens (1 Peter 
2:9-10, Matthew 5:13-16, Hebrews 11:8-16) in explaining the relationship between individuals 
and the Church. 
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This passage is striking for a number of reasons—we see Paul stress the importance of the 
community of the Church in relating to God and the need to be united together.6 However, we 
also see that this cannot be any community—the Church must be a radically inclusive 
community; both the weak and strong, the seemingly dispensable and indispensable, the 
seemingly honourable and dishonourable, are to be regarded as vital parts of the same collective 
whole and vital parts of the Church’s worship.7  
The theological position outlined above, which claims that worship is primarily 
performed by groups and not just individuals, provides a difficult philosophical problem:8 While 
                                                 
6 We can find this emphasis on the corporate nature of worship in many places in the theological 
literature. For instance, Evelyn Underhill writes,  
 
The worshipping life of the Christian whilst profoundly personal, is essentially that of a 
person who is also a member of a group…The Christian as such cannot fulfil his 
spiritual obligations in solitude. He forms part of a social and spiritual complex with a 
new relation to God; an organism which is quickened and united by… [the] Spirit. (1936, 
83). 
 
As Underhill goes on to note, a Christian’s relationship to God must be understood through her 
relationship as a member of a group—the body of Christ. To understand the nature and purpose 
of liturgy, according to Underhill, we need to see liturgical action as an example of ‘joint action’ 
(1936, 99), which is, she maintains, the reason why some agreed pattern of liturgy is so vital for 
Christian worship. Similarly, Alexander Schmemann (1966), writing in the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition, writes that, ‘the division in principle between “corporate” and “private” worship must 
be discarded. The purpose of worship is to constitute the Church, precisely to bring what is 
“private” into the new life, to transform it into what belongs to the Church’ (1966, 24).  
7 Barbara Newman (2011), in her writing on inclusivity and disability in the Church, takes these 
words of Paul’s to provide a challenge for the contemporary Church in how it treats those with 
ASD. She writes that ‘our weaknesses and needs are part of God’s design so that others may 
minister to us. We truly were created to need one another’ (2011, 16). As we will see, this issue of 
inclusivity will act as a kind of litmus test for the models of church worship I later consider. 
8 I am not claiming that there can be no individual worship, but, rather, that individual worship 
must be understood in its relation to the Church as a whole. This will become clear in the final 
two sections of the paper. With thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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it is clear that the individual members of a church can be agents who use their minds and powers 
to worship God, it is entirely unclear how a gathered church, which has neither a mind nor 
powers over and above the minds and powers of its members, can be an agent which worships 
God. This is the philosophical problem that the foregoing theology of worship gives rise to, and 
what the remainder of this paper is devoted to addressing.  
However, before we can give a response this question, greater clarity is needed. If we are 
to give an account of how individuals can be related to a gathered church in worship, we must 
first specify just what a church is.9 To complicate matters, the term ‘church’ is used in a diversity 
of ways. For instance, in his introduction to Anglican Ecclesiology, Paul Avis gives four 
definitions of ‘church’ (Church catholic, particular Church traditions, Church diocese, and 
Church parishes), all of which he regards as groups which are engaged in worship in some way. 
To simplify matters somewhat, here I will refer to two uses of ‘church’: (i) the whole Church, 
which is constituted (at least) by individual church congregations, which are globally distinct, 
historically separated and theologically diverse, and, (ii) a gathered church, which is constituted by 
individuals who are part of a community and which gather together, primarily on a Sunday. We 
should also keep in mind that there is an important connection between these two kinds of 
church. As Evelyn Underhill, the 20th century Anglo-Catholic theologian stresses, it is important 
to recognise that in some sense, all worship is a part of the worship of the whole Church. She 
writes, 
 
It is plain that the living experience of this whole Church, visible and invisible, past and 
present, stretched out in history and yet poised on God, must set the scene for Christian 
worship; not the poor little scrap of which any one soul, or any sectional group, is 
capable. Thus there must be a traditional worshipping act of the Church, a great liturgical 
life, of which the sectional worship of its various groups and branches will form a part, 
and to which the many-levelled action of its isolated members with all their varying 
moods and insights contributes; an act which includes and harmonizes all apparent 
differences. (1936, 85). 
 
These remarks help us to situate the context of the Church’s worship. However, whilst this 
context is important, in giving an account of the group actions involved in worship, my primary 
focus will be on a gathered church and not the whole Church. Yet, even in a local, gathered church 
                                                 
9 With thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this clarification.  
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context there is an important role for group action. We can see this clearly in Stanley Hauerwas’s 
writing on ecclesiology. Hauewas writes that, 
 
Gathering indicates that Christians are called from the world, from their homes, from 
their families, to be constituted into a community capable of praising God…The church 
is constituted as a new people who have been gathered from the nations to remind the 
world that we are in fact one people. Gathering, therefore, is an eschatological act as it is 
the foretaste of the unity of the communion of the saints. (1995, 157).10 
 
Thus, even in a small scale gathered church community, Hauerwas thinks it important to 
emphasize the community’s worship of God and not merely the individual’s. Indeed, as we can 
see, he maintains that there is some kind of resemblance between a gathered church and the whole 
Church. Yet, even at a small, gathered level, this question is still philosophically challenging—it is 
far from clear how a gathered group of individuals could be regarded as an agent of worship. 
 With these theological issues outlined, we can now think more carefully about what the 
best model for understanding a gathered church’s actions in worship is, and then to see how 
such an account handles non-paradigm participants.  
 
Liturgical action 
To provide a model of group liturgical action, it will first be important to think more generally 
about what it is to engage in liturgical action. To do this, I consider two recent accounts of 
liturgical action which will help inform the proceeding enquiry.  
In recent work by Terence Cuneo (2016) and Nicholas Wolterstorff (2015, 2018), both 
seek to give a philosophical definition of what it is to act liturgically.11 Cuneo argues that the 
                                                 
10 This emphasis on the church’s gathering from a variety of spheres of society is discussed in 
detail by Smith (2009, 159-166) 
11 Another philosophical account of liturgical action can be found in James K.A. Smith’s (2009) 
work on liturgy. Smith maintains that liturgy is not something which is contained only to church 
services, but, rather, it is something which pervades all aspects of our life; human beings are 
worshipping creatures, or, ‘homo liturgicus’, to use his terminology (2009, 37-42). Whilst we cannot 
cease from worshipping, Smith holds, we can become more aware of what and how we worship 
and this can illuminate our understanding of the actions involved in corporate worship. As Smith 
notes, ‘it is important also to keep in mind that worship is best understood on the order of 
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seemingly random collection of bodily actions from his own Eastern Orthodox tradition are a 
collection of scripted activities which are ‘constituents of an identifiable pattern’ (2016, 155), that 
of ‘blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God’ (2016, 156). It is not the case, according to 
Cuneo, that these bodily actions merely accompany the linguistic acts of petitioning or blessing, 
but, rather, he argues, in the context of liturgy, these bodily actions ‘count as cases of engaging 
God by blessing, petitioning and thanking God’ (2016, 156). Wolterstorff provides a similar 
account of liturgical action, using the analogy of a piece of music to explain the relationship 
between the script, our bodily actions and the non-bodily actions involved in worship. A 
musician follows a score to guide her to perform a certain sequence of sounds, in such a way that 
‘the musical work is the sound sequence type that is instantiated when the correctness-rules that 
the composer has instantiated are faithfully followed’ (2015, 6). Similarly, a liturgical script 
‘specifies a set of rules for a correct liturgical enactment’ (2015, 7), which, in turn, allows for the 
performance of certain acts of worship. 
To see how this account works, let us consider a specific example from Wolterstorff. In 
reading and listening to lines of liturgy and passages of Scripture, Wolterstorff thinks, an 
individual can engage in a kind of mutual address with God. For instance, in using the second 
personal pronoun in the liturgical script (e.g. ‘Eternal God, heavenly Father, you have graciously 
accepted us as living members of your Son our Savior Jesus Christ’ (Book of Common Prayer, 365, 
quoted in Wolterstorff, 2015, 56)), a person can ‘strongly address’ God (2015, 58). That is, they 
can address God with the ‘expectation or hope that one’s addressee will realize that they are 
being addressed’ (2015, 58). Furthermore, in listening to lines of the liturgy from the priest or the 
other congregants, Wolterstorff maintains that an individual might listen to God. The 
assumption in much of the Episcopal liturgy, he notes, is that ‘people have been listening not 
just to the speaker but to what God said or says’ (2015, 64). Thus, on Wolterstorff’s account, 
these mundane acts of listening and speaking, in the context of worship, can count as acts of 
engaging in mutual address with God.  
  
                                                 
action not refection; worship is something that we do’ (2009, 166). For Smith, the actions 
involved in corporate church liturgies play an important role in shaping and moulding the 
worship of both the community and the individual. Bruce Ellis Benson’s (2013) discussion of 
liturgy follows a similar line to Smith’s in thinking of liturgy in a broader, more holistic sense, 
rather than focusing only on corporate acts of worship.  
 
 9 
Group liturgical action  
Whilst the above accounts of acting liturgically are helpful, we are yet to see how acting 
liturgically might be considered a group action.12 In many respects, this is an issue which is not 
unique to the actions of a church; in every day speech, we ascribe actions to groups—we speak 
of the government’s investment in public services, a football team’s excellent passing movement, 
and a rock band’s engaging performance. If, as we have been assuming, a gathered church is a 
group constituted by many individuals, then acting as a group in worship may be no different to 
a football team’s tactical movement or a rock band’s synchronicity on stage.  
Helpfully, there is a vast philosophical literature devoted to thinking about how 
individuals can act together as groups. By paying attention this literature, we can gain a better 
grasp on the communal nature of liturgical action.  
First, there are many cases of group action which are instances of what Deborah 
Tollefsen describes as ‘shared agency’ (2015, 3). As Tollefsen defines it, shared-agency refers to 
‘the ability of individuals to engage in joint actions such as moving a table together, painting a 
house together, or playing a game of chess’ (2015, 3). In explaining cases of shared-agency, 
philosophers usually provide some kind of account which refers to the meshing or joining of the 
individual intentions involved in the group action. I will consider one such account in the next 
section.  
                                                 
12 We see some attempt in Wolterstorff’s work to consider this question. He writes that, 
 
The church enacts the liturgy not to satisfy the needs and desires of individual 
congregants but to worship God. …It’s not the individual members who do these things 
simultaneously; it’s the assembled body that does these things. (2015, 11) 
 
Whilst there is no attempt to give such an account in The God We Worship, there is a way of 
extending what Wolterstorff writes to accommodate corporate action by looking at Cuneo’s 
work on corporate acts of worship. Indeed, in his forthcoming book, Acting Liturgically, 
Wolterstorff will address this issue of collective worship by drawing on much of the same 
literature that I will consider in the next section of this paper. Smith devotes more time to the 
question of corporate worship than Wolterstorff. For instance, he writes that, ‘worship is not a 
private affair; we have gathered as a people, as a congregation, and just as we are dependent on 
our redeeming Creator, so too are we dependent on one another’ (2009, 169).  
 10 
However, we might also describe a kind of group action which goes beyond individuals 
acting together in individual cases. Tollefsen notes that, ‘[w]hen two people take a walk together 
they are engaged in a form of shared-agency, but in doing so they do not form a unified agent to 
which we attribute beliefs, goals, and intentions’ (2015, 5). For example, the government’s 
investment in public services might involve some kind of shared-agency, but there is arguably 
more to this action than the synchronisation of multiple individual intentions. Following 
Tollefsen, we can describe the government’s actions as an example of group-agency. That is, we can 
provide an analysis which seeks to explain how the group as a whole can perform some action as 
the result of a decision-making process. In discussing the agency of a particular group, as 
Tollefsen clarifies, philosophers have been interested predominantly in corporate groups, groups 
that ‘have a structure and a decision-making process’ (2015, 3). Furthermore, in general, 
corporate groups maintain their identity, despite changes in membership. Thus, for instance, 
when Teresa May took over as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom after David Cameron’s 
resignation, it still made sense to refer to the government’s investment in public services, despite 
most of the ministers in the government being replaced. The government as a group-agent 
survived this change in membership.  
 Building on the account of liturgical action outlined previously, along with the distinction 
between group-agency and shared-agency, we are now in a position to outline two models for 
thinking about group liturgical action.  
 
Shared-agency and liturgical action 
First, let us consider how an account of shared-agency might help to explain the actions involved 
in corporate worship. In his analysis of liturgical singing, Cuneo attempts to give a model of 
liturgical action which builds on the philosophical literature on shared-agency. Whilst the 
particular focus of Cuneo’s chapter is on sung liturgy, this is primarily a feature of the context of 
his discussion, namely, the Eastern Orthodox liturgy, which is almost entirely sung (2016, 126). 
Thus, as I will suggest, this analysis can be extended much further than is implied by Cuneo’s 
discussion. According to Cuneo, singing as a part of a group requires a kind of responsiveness to 
the other singers present which is not required when singing alone (2016, 135). To engage in the 
group act of singing, we must pay attention to what the other individuals are doing, and one’s 
own actions do not stand on their own, but, rather, they are part of a larger act which is 
performed by the congregation.  
To show how we might make sense of these observations, Cuneo maintains that we can 
appeal to the philosophical literature on shared-agency. More specifically, Cuneo appeals to 
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Searle (1990, 2010), who maintains that we can make a distinction between individual intention 
and group intention by considering two different examples of group action: 
 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. 
Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally 
located, shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence “I am running 
to the shelter.” But for each person, we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely 
independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case, there is no collective 
behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a 
common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a 
common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an outdoor 
ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common 
point. We can even imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in 
the two cases; the people running for shelter make the same types of bodily movements 
as the ballet dancers. Externally observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are 
clearly different internally. (1990, 403-404) 
 
Searle maintains that even if these cases are behaviourally indistinguishable, the first is a case in 
which all the agents act in the same way, each with a similar intention, and the second requires 
the individuals to have what he calls ‘we-intentions’. By ‘we-intention’, Searle means that the 
individuals have a collective intention which is not reducible to the intentions of each individual 
agent. In other words, in the first case, the group all happen to do the same action at the same 
time, and, in the second case, the group cooperate to perform an action together. 
 Although most philosophers would agree that there is a distinction to be made between 
these two cases, there is some disagreement about how best to analyse this distinction.13 Because 
of this, there are many possible ways of analysing the collective intentions involved in worship. 
Here, I follow Cuneo in using Searle’s analysis. For Searle, collective intention is not reducible to 
individual intention. He distinguishes, for instance, between a case in which a group of 
economics students all graduate with the intention to put Adam Smith’s theories into practice 
                                                 
13 The literature on collective intention is vast and a survey of the positions one could hold 
would be much longer than the intended length of this paper. For the key positions in this 
debate, see Tuomela 2013, Bratman 1999, Miller 2001, Velleman 1989, and Searle 1990, 2010. 
For an excellent summary of the above literature, see Tollefsen, 2015, 27-50.  
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with an awareness of the intentions of others, and a case in which the graduates make a solemn 
pact to put Adam Smith’s economics into practice after their graduation (2010, 47-48).  The 
difference between these two cases, according to Searle, comes down to the role of cooperation, 
which, he thinks, is crucial in giving an account of collective intention. He writes, ‘Cooperation 
implies the existence of common knowledge or common belief, but the common knowledge or 
belief, together with individual intentions to achieve a common goal is not by itself sufficient for 
cooperation’ (2010, 49; emphasis in the original). Thus, on Searle’s account, when cooperation is 
present in this way, the structure of our intentions is different. To take an example which Searle 
uses, that of the piano/violin duet (2010, 52), it is not that I-intend that I play the piano whilst 
believing that you play the violin. But, rather, as he describes it,  
 
We are performing a duet where I play the piano part and you play the violin part. Here 
our playing does not cause the duet to be performed. My playing and your playing simply 
constitute the performance of the duet. So from my point of view, I have a collective 
intention-in-action that we play the duet by way of me playing the piano, in a context where I 
take it for granted that you are playing the violin. (2010, 52; emphasis in the original)  
 
In Searle’s example, my intention is a collective intention rather than an individual intention. 
Searle thinks that it is not the case that I merely intend to play the piano and I believe that you 
will play the violin, as he thinks some accounts of collective intention describe. But, rather, 
according to Searle, the content of my intention is different when I act cooperatively than when 
I act individually—we intend to act collectively. Whilst Searle thinks that I must have certain 
beliefs about what the other will do, these beliefs are not what make my intention collective, but, 
rather, there is something irreducible about the nature of my intention when I act cooperatively.  
 Now, with Searle’s position outlined, let us consider Cuneo’s application of this analysis 
to explain the nature of liturgical singing. Cuneo writes, 
 
Group singing clearly seems to satisfy the criteria for collective action specified above: it 
requires the requisite “we intentions,” that these intentions fit together in the right ways, 
and an awareness of one another’s intentions… to engage in group singing also requires 
that I adjust my singing to yours and that you adjust your singing to mine in “real time,” 
often in ways that are not dictated by the score that we are following. (2016, 138). 
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We can see how Searle’s analysis is helpful in explaining the nature of the collective act of 
singing. Just like the piano and violin players who cooperate to perform the duet, the 
congregation need to employ some kind of cooperation or responsiveness to collectively sing the 
lines of the liturgy. Thus, on Cuneo’s analysis, it is not the case that congregants intend 
individually to sing, but, rather, they we-intend that the liturgical script is sung by means of their 
individual performances.  
 Whilst Cuneo’s analysis focuses on the specific example of liturgical singing, it appears 
promising as an account of liturgical action more generally. Indeed, as we have seen, if we are to 
regard a church as the proper agent of worship and not merely the individual congregants, then 
an account of collective intention appears to provide an analysis which allows us to make this the 
case. To return to Wolterstorff’s example of mutually addressing God, let us consider how 
Searle’s analysis might be adapted in the case of our addressing God as a congregation. In the 
congregational action of addressing God, there are many individual actions which constitute the 
action, namely, each individual’s reading of the liturgical script. Thus, just as Searle gives the 
analysis of performing a duet constituted of two parts, we can give a similar analysis of the 
intention involved in addressing God. That is, although I do form the intention to read my part 
of the liturgical script, just as the duet playing pianist forms the intention to perform the piano 
part, this singular intention is a constituent part of my intention that we address God. If 
addressing God in corporate worship is something that we do, then it must be part of our 
intentions that we perform the action, and not just that I perform the action. Just as the duet 
players each intend their constituent parts whilst also intending to perform the piece as a 
collective, the individual intends to play their part in worship whilst intending to worship God as 
a congregation.  
 This extension of Searle’s analysis of collective intention to liturgical worship gives us a 
clear model of how individual actions can be related to the actions of a gathered church. Indeed, 
in cooperating with the other members of a congregation, our intentions can somehow combine 
to form a collective intention, and thus a collective action. However, whilst the literate on 
shared-agency is useful in explaining how actions such as reading and singing might be 
coordinated, it cannot provide a complete account of the actions of a worshipping church.14  
                                                 
14 It should be noted that this is no criticism of Cuneo’s or Wolterstorff’s accounts of liturgical 
action; neither are attempting to give a complete account of the Church’s corporate acts of 
worship, but, rather, they seek to provide some analysis of some of the actions involved in 
worship.  
 14 
Shared-agency and inclusivity  
In this section, I consider how well a shared-agency model of group liturgical action can handle 
non-paradigm participants in the church’s worship. Whilst clearly there are examples of instances 
of shared-agency in corporate worship in, say, the singing of the liturgical script or the repeating 
of the Lord’s prayer in unison, I will argue that there are limitations to the shared-agency model 
which mean that the group-agency model has more explanatory scope.  
 Problematically for the shared-agency model, in basing an account of group liturgical 
action on collective intentions, we must assume that all members of a congregation can form 
‘we-intentions’. Yet, there are clearly members of most, if not all, congregations who are simply 
unable to engage in this kind of complex coordinated group action. Young children, some elderly 
individuals and some neuro-atypical individuals would surely find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
participate in shared-agency in way described above. 15 Such an account requires a level of 
competency and social attentiveness which appears to exclude many individuals from 
contributing to the actions of a church’s worship. 
 To see this point more forcefully, I will focus on how individuals with ASD might 
participate in the church’s worship, conceived in these terms. As recent psychological literature 
on ASD has shown, such individuals have difficulty, or cannot, form ‘we-intentions’. As 
Tomasello, et al. note in their discussion of the neurological basis for shared intention amongst 
humans,  
  
[c]hildren with autism show very little coordinated joint engagement, and initiate very 
few bids for joint attention with others by declaratively pointing to or showing 
objects…With regard to collaborative engagement, children with autism engage in 
relatively little cooperative play with peers and in general collaborate with others very 
little…the vast majority of children with autism do not participate in the cultural and 
symbolic activities around them in anything like the normal way. (2005, 686). 
 
In agreement with these findings by Tomasello, et al.., Colombi, et al. argue that, ‘that an 
impairment in imitation and joint attention alters developmental trajectories involving 
cooperative development and prevents children with autism from fully participating in 
                                                 
15 Yet, as N.T. Wright argues, ‘God has ways of making himself known intimately to children 
from their earliest days. Perhaps one of the—dare I say—sacramental ways by which God does 
that is precisely by the loving welcome of the Christian community’ (2008).  
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cooperative tasks’ (2009, 158-159). Whilst the precise neurological mechanisms which underpin 
collective intentionality are up for debate, what seems uncontroversial from the psychological 
literature is that autistic children struggle to engage in cooperative activities in the same way as 
neuro-typical individuals. Furthermore, it also seems clear that this developmental difference in 
some autistic individuals can have a significant impact on their ability to engage in cooperative 
tasks later in life. There are at least some individuals who would simply be unable to participate 
in worship as a collective action in the way described previously, or, at the very least, they would 
find such engagement profoundly difficult. For instance, consider Ann Memmott’s description 
of what it is like for a person with autism trying to follow a Eucharistic service. She writes,  
 
Just when my ability to cope is at its lowest ebb, I have to try to understand what I do for 
Communion. People know when to stand up, when to move forwards (apparently they 
know to do this just by looking at where someone is standing and noticing the slightest 
nod of the head. I don’t notice this.). I have to work out which bit of kneeling-cushion to 
aim for, or where to stand, how long to wait before going up there. What to do with my 
hands when I get the bread and wine and what to say and when. The rest of the people 
know when to stand up again, when to go back, when to say something like AMEN 
when you’re up there. (2015, 9). 
 
Similarly, Barabra Newman describes the challenges individuals with ASD face in participating in 
corporate worship. She notes, for instance, that, 
 
many churches assume that people have attended a worship service before and that they 
can quickly adapt their behavior to fit in with the rest of the people in a specific setting. 
People with ASD—and many visitors too—find this assumption intimidating, and it 
keeps them from attending church and participating in the life of the church. (2011, 73). 
 
Newman notes that knowing when to say ‘amen’, what to do during offerings, how to engage in 
communion, how loudly and when to sing, can all be challenging to individuals with ASD if 
insufficiently explained (2011, 73).16  
                                                 
16 As Newman notes, ASD indicates a ‘range of behaviors and needs’ (2011, 23); she highlights 
the need for churches to understand the particular needs of individuals, rather than applying 
blanket rules across the board (2011, 23). 
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All the above appears to be problematic for the shared-agency model of group liturgical 
action. It seems strange to suggest that autistic individuals are excluded from the actions of a 
church since they lack the capabilities to cooperate in the manner required for collective 
intention. If Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians are to be taken seriously, then surely individuals with 
ASD are precisely those who he urges the Church to include. The lack of inclusivity in the 
shared-agency model points to a crucial difference between a church community and other 
forms of social group—the actions of a church in worship cannot be limited to only those who 
are able to engage in high-level coordinated action.  
However, it may be possible to rescue a shared-agency model by providing ways of 
accommodating neuro-atypical individuals in worship. There are small accommodations that can 
be made in Church worship to include such individuals; in her guide for helping churches cater 
for individuals on the autistic spectrum, Memmott describes how collective worship can be 
structured in a manner which caters for autistic individuals. She imagines a Church service which 
is set up for such an individual:  
 
The Vicar had already met with me to show me the church, and it has a good website 
‘blog’ with pictures and service updates on it so that I know what will happen. … The 
people in the congregation are really friendly and they know to introduce themselves 
each time if I don’t greet them by name, so I don’t have to try to guess who they are. 
There’s someone who is a quiet friend to me in the congregation, who can explain 
changes or explain anything I don’t know or don’t understand from the service. In The 
Peace, people know that I’m not being rude if I miss eye contact or want to stop shaking 
hands for a while. No-one is offended. The service sheet has ‘stand up’ and ‘sit down’ 
written in the right places so it’s so easy to follow. (2015, 9-10). 
 
We might also stress that there can be different levels of participation involved in worship. 
Whilst not all people can be involved in the act of collective singing or reading the liturgy in the 
right way, this does not mean they cannot be involved at all.17 
However, whilst these suggestions of accommodation are important, it is possible to 
accommodate an individual without truly including them in worship as an equal contributor. 
Metaphorically speaking, if we think of the worship of a church as the performance of a piece of 
orchestral music, it might be possible to accommodate individuals in such a way that they can 
                                                 
17 Thanks to anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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feel comfortable appreciating the music of the orchestra, but proper inclusivity means that all of 
the players can play their own instrument in the orchestra, and the same is true for the 
performance of worship. As Benjamin Conner argues, ‘accommodating people with 
developmental disabilities so they can be present in a nondisruptive way is not enough; we must 
challenge church structures. We must be realistic about the structural changes that must attend 
becoming an inclusive church’ (2012, 92).  
It is important to avoid the implication that to contribute to a church’s worship, those 
who have difficulties in forming we-intentions should fit around those who are typical. In 
considering the role of neuro-atypical individuals in the Church, we must speak not only of 
accommodating, then, but we must also consider what such individuals can contribute. As Kevin 
Timpe explains, drawing from the work of disability consultant Cara Milne, ‘integration is not 
the same as inclusion’ (2017, 20.04). Whereas integration includes the provision of legal rights 
and protection for individuals with disabilities, inclusion goes further, and requires ‘full 
opportunity for participation and value in one’s social environments’ (2017, 20.15). An account 
of a church’s acting in worship should be one that not only integrates those with neurological 
and physical differences into the work of a church, but also includes them as a constitutive part 
of a church’s actions in worship. Yet, it is difficult to see how a shared-agency account can 
provide such a model of group action.18  
 
Group-agency  
We can now consider how an account of group-agency might provide a more inclusive model of 
group liturgical action.19  
                                                 
18 To be clear: to point out that a shared-agency model has difficulties providing and inclusive 
account of worship is not to claim that the account of shared-agency in liturgical singing offered 
by Cuneo is not fit for purpose. As we have already seen, shared-agency and group-agency are 
attempting to explain different phenomenon. Whilst shared-agency is well suited to explain the 
coordinated action of singing the liturgy, it cannot explain all of the kinds of involvement in a 
church’s worship. This limitation of the shared-agency model, in explaining only the 
participation of the neruo-typical in certain acts of liturgy, points to the need for a broader, 
pluralistic model of Church agency.  
19 The literature on group-agency is vast. Tollefsen (2015) gives a detailed overview of the key 
positions in Chapter 3 of Groups as Agents. Here, I focus only on List and Pettit’s account. 
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 As Tollefsen notes, ‘in everyday contexts we often talk as if groups were agents with 
attitudes such as belief and intention’ (2015, 1). Moreover, such actions do not seem to be 
analyzable only in terms of shared-agency. Indeed, there seem to be some cases in which we 
might ordinarily think of groups as the originators of certain actions in which there is no shared-
agency. A government’s acting in response to a global crisis might involve the coordinated 
actions of cabinet of ministers, but it might sometimes involve only the actions of one individual 
who is authorized to act on behalf of the group. Shared-agency accounts cannot explain all 
instances of group action.  
 Rather than analyzing specific actions, and considering what role individuals play in these 
actions, accounts of group-agency tend to focus first on the nature of agency, and then to think 
about how a group of individuals might fulfil certain criteria for acting. For instance, Peter 
French (1995) argues that agents must display the capacities for intentionality (i.e. they must do 
something for a reason or purpose), rationality (i.e. they must be responsive to arguments that 
concern these reasons) and, they must be able to respond to criticism (i.e. they must be capable 
of adjusting their actions accordingly) (1994, 10-12). French maintains that many corporate 
groups meet these criteria, and so should be considered agents. Similarly, List and Pettit give the 
following conditions for agency:  
 
an “agent”, on our account, is a system which these features: it has representational 
states, motivational states, and a capacity to act on their basis. When processed 
appropriately, the representational states co-vary with certain variations in the 
environment: for example, with the changing positions of cylinders. And the 
motivational states leave the agent at rest on trigger action, depending on whether the 
motivating specifications are realized or unrealized in the represented environment. 
(2011, 20)  
 
On their account, to be considered an agent, something must have (1) representational states, (2) 
motivational states, and (3) a capacity to act on these states. Note that these conditions for 
agency are very minimal.20 Thus, if a robot can process information about its surroundings and 
act accordingly, it should be considered an agent.21 It is important to note here that an agent is 
                                                 
20 No account of group agency is without its problems. Whilst I focus primarily on List and 
Pettit’s account here, this is one way amongst many of giving an account of group-agency.  
21 In expanding this discussion, List and Pettit write that,  
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not the same as a person on this analysis.22 To ascribe agency to something is only to claim that it 
is somehow the originator of a particular action, or set of actions. As Tollefsen notes, this need 
not commit one to thinking that all agents are phenomenally conscious (2015, 53). Indeed, none 
of the accounts described above think that groups are capable of phenomenal consciousness, but 
rather, they describe mental states (such as intentions) in broadly functionalist terms which do 
not require that propositional attitudes can only be held by phenomenally conscious agents. The 
shortcoming of such an approach, Tollefsen suggests, is that ‘if you are a person that thinks that 
propositional attitudes are states only of phenomenally conscious beings, then group mental 
states are going to be a particularly difficult thing for you to swallow’ (2015, 53). 
Assuming some version of the above conditions for agency is plausible, it seems possible 
that just as an individual or robot could meet these conditions by having the relevant 
motivational states and representational states, a group of individuals, organised in the correct 
way, could also meet these criteria. In providing an account of group agency, it is important to 
see that not any collective of individual would meet the above criteria. As Tollefsen notes, 
‘corporate groups’ unlike ‘aggregative groups’ have a ‘structure and a decision-making process’ 
(2015, 3) which makes it possible for them to act as agents. Similarly, List and Pettit note, 
corporate groups have ‘an identity that can survive changes of membership’ (2011, 31), such as ‘a 
nation, a university, or a purposive organisation’ (2011, 31).  
 To see how such groups could fulfil criteria for agency, I will consider two kinds of 
groups which List and Pettit claim can be structured in such a way that agency is possible. The 
first possibility concerns groups in which no shared-agency is involved, and the second concerns 
                                                 
 
Representational and motivational states, which we also call “intentional states”, are 
configurations in an agent’s physical make-up that play a particular role or function in 
engaging with other such states and in producing action. A state is “representational” if it 
plays the role of depicting the world, and “motivational” if it plays the role of motivating 
action. … We make no assumptions about the precise physical nature of intentional 
states. They may be of a wide variety of kinds. … We only require that they be 
configurations of the agent—or perhaps configurations of the agent in context—that 
play the appropriate functional role. (2011, 21). 
22 Whilst on the account of personhood they eventually give (2011, 170-185), all persons are 
agents, not all agents are persons. 
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groups which act (at least partly) by means of shared-agency. First, let us consider an account of 
group-agency which does not involve shared-agency.  
First, It is possible, List and Pettit argue, by ‘a process of natural or cultural evolution’, 
that ‘members are selected for possessing traits that lead them to act as required for group 
agency’ (2011, 32). Although, as they admit, there are no obvious examples of human beings 
combining in this way, there are many examples from other species. They note, for example, that 
certain studies of bee hives show that ‘bees can combine, on the basis of simple signals, so as to 
perform as a group agent’ (2011, 33).23 For instance, in a study by Thomas D. Seeley (2001) on 
the behaviour of bee colonies, Seeley observes that groups of bees ‘often possess impressive 
powers of decision making, especially with respect to simultaneous-option decisions’ (2011, 249). 
Yet, remarkably, no one member of the colony can have this level of cognitive processing by 
itself. Thus, although the bees do not collectively intend to make decisions, the structure of the 
colony as a whole means that conditions for agency can be met by the actions of the group. Or, 
to give another example, consider a terrorist cell at the ground level. In such a group, there are 
‘one or several organizational designers co-opting others into a structure underpinning group-
agency, without making them aware of their agency at the group level and without seeking their 
intentional acquiescence in the arrangement’ (List and Pettit 2011, 33).  
Secondly, it is possible for a group to exhibit group level agency by means of various 
instances of shared agency. In such cases, a group of individuals ‘intend that they together act so 
as to form and enact a single system of belief and desire, at least within a clearly defined scope; 
they each intend to do their own part in a salient plan for ensuring group-agency within that 
scope, believing that others will do their part too’ (2011, 34). However, the kind of cooperation 
that is necessary for this kind of group-agency, according to List and Pettit, need not require that 
each individual is an ‘equal and willing partner’ in the composition and actions of the group 
(2011, 34). Whilst, on such a model, some shared-agency is required, not all members of the 
group are required to have an equal stake. Indeed, as they go on to note, there are two ways in 
which an individual might be related to such a group. They might take an authorizing role, or an 
active role. If the individual takes an active role, then they act with ‘full awareness for the pursuit 
of the group’s ends’ (2011, 35). That is, they act wholly or partly on behalf of a group when they 
act. However, the individual might also take an authorizing role, that is, they might simply accept 
the group as an agent and allow the group to speak on behalf of its members, such as in the case 
                                                 
23 To consider this example in more detail, see Seeley 2001 and List, Elsholtz, and Seeley, 2009.  
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of being a member of a trade union (2011, 35). In such a case, someone is the member of a 
group, yet their own actions and intentions play no role in the actions of that group.  
 They key feature of the above analysis which is useful in application to acts of worship is 
that even in cases of group-agency which do involve shared-agency, not all the agents need to 
play the same role in performing the group action. Indeed, the role that one plays in relation to 
the group depends on (a) the structure of that particular group in making decisions and forming 
judgments and (b) one’s relation to the structure of the particular group. For example, in the case 
of a tyrannous regime, what it is for a government to have group-agency is true only in virtue of 
the actions of the tyrant, so long as the individual members authorize the tyrant’s actions in 
some way. But, it is still true, at least in some sense, that the group acts when the tyrant acts. As 
List and Pettit argue,  
 
In a jointly intentional group agent, the two types of members are typically present and 
often overlap. In a participatory group like a voluntary association, members have the 
same status within the group agent; they equally authorize the group agent and take 
roughly equal parts in acting on its behalf. In a hierarchical organization, such as a 
commercial corporation or a church, there may be differences in the members’ roles, for 
example through holding different offices or through belonging to subgroups with 
different tasks. (2011, 36). 
 
An account of group-agency seeks to provide a very different kind of explanation of group 
action than an account of shared-agency. As Tollefsen highlights, ‘the connection between 
group-agency and shared-agency is not always clear in the literature’ (2015, 5), but it seems that 
two are importantly related. As we have seen, shared-agency is sometimes involved in group-
agency, but not always. An account of group-agency attempts to attribute an action not to a 
number of coordinated individuals, but, rather, to a group, an entity with its own decision-
making processes. In some cases, the conditions for agency are met by the democratic votes of 
the members of the group in which they jointly intend an action, in other cases, these conditions 
are met by a hierarchical structure in which a small senior group of individuals jointly intend on 
behalf of a much larger group of individuals. In other cases, the individual agents display no (or 
little) shared-agency, yet, because the group of individuals is structured in a particular way, it is 
possible for the group to form goal orientated representational states which go beyond the 
mental states of the group members. 
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In the next section, I consider whether an account of group-agency might provide a 
broader, pluralistic model of the church’s acting in worship than we have so far considered.  
 
Group-agency and liturgical action  
To give an account of group-agency in liturgical worship, we need to say something about a 
church’s ontology. And whilst there is not space here to give a fully worked out ecclesiology, it is 
possible to make some general observations that can help us to consider how an account of 
group-agency might help to explain group action in worship. 
 First, it is important to see that there are also some features of Christian worship which 
have striking similarities to other social structures, which can help us to see the ontology of 
certain kinds of congregational groups. However, such an analysis will not apply equally to all 
congregational structures. The ontological structures of free Church group agents will differ 
from those of Anglican group agents, for instance. One particular example of such differences 
can be found in thinking about how different traditions account for Church membership. As we 
have seen, in order to give an account of group-agency, we need an account of group structure 
and an account of group membership.  
Now, in many free Church contexts, to be a member of a specific Church is to be 
baptized, to ascribe to a certain doctrinal statement, and to adhere to certain behavioral 
standards. In contrast to this, in Anglican Churches, membership is often regarded as 
synonymous simply with baptism. In the Anglican Church, baptism is often available to infants 
and those with severe neurological impairments, given that parents and godparents can make 
promises on their behalf. Thus, when a church congregation acts as a group in worship in the 
Anglican context, simply in virtue of their baptism, a young infant could be considered a part of 
that church’s worship. Just as a worker should be considered a part of the trade union’s industrial 
action, in virtue of her being a member of the trade union, any baptized individual should be 
considered a part of a church’s actions in worship.  
As we saw in List and Pettit’s work, there are at least two ways in which an individual 
who is a member of a group might contribute to a group action. First, let us consider a kind of 
authorizing action. Underhill, writing on group on action in worship, notes that in some forms 
of worship, the priest or a group of elders are seen as acting on behalf of the whole congregation 
in prayer. In such a case, she notes, ‘action and speech are delegated to a person or group; the 
congregation uniting itself by intention to that which is done. Thus, a focus is provided, a certain 
unity of direction is ensured; and the liturgical action covers and unites the devotion of simple 
and learned’ (1936, 96). We might think, then, that in some contexts, the priest holds a similar 
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role to the CEO of an organization in the actions of the Church in worship—there are actions 
which only he or she performs, but which are counted as actions of the group. As Underhill 
describes, in some traditions, the Daily Office is chanted by a choir or group of monks on behalf 
of the whole Church (1936, 96). Such representative action would surely include some form of 
shared-agency from those participating in the spoken liturgy, yet, by also giving an account of 
group-agency, we can see how all of those who are considered members of a church can in some 
way be a part of these liturgical acts. In belonging to a church community through baptism, or by 
some other form of membership, one takes an authorizing role in recognizing those who act in 
providing representative group action in worship. Note that unlike most cases of authorization, 
those churches which allow for infant baptism, or baptism of those with severe neurological 
impairment, involve a complex kind of authorized action. In the case of infant baptism, just as 
the parent makes promises on behalf of the child which relate to her faith in Christ, the parent 
can also be seen as making a kind of representative authorization action—that is, the parent 
authorizes the relevant authorities in a church structure to speak on behalf of the child in 
worship.  
 Secondly, let us consider how individuals might play an active role. As List and Petit 
acknowledge, there are a variety of ways of playing an active role in a group’s acting: 
 
Ordinary believers are usually not as active in a church as priests and bishops but they 
still authorize the church equally, taking it to speak for the group in religious matters. 
Ordinary workers do not authorize a commercial company in the manner of 
shareholders and directors—it is these agents who provide the money and the votes that 
keep the firm on track—but they play a similar if not greater part in acting on behalf of 
the group. (2011, 36). 
 
Whilst the individual’s active role in a group will no doubt be different to that of a priest or 
elder, they can still contribute to the actions of the group. Indeed, the examples they give of 
playing an active role in a group include, ‘the members of a church in participating in religious 
ceremonies or in proselytizing among non-believers’ (2011, 35). The organizational structure of a 
church will depend, in part, on one’s tradition, but it seems clear that a member of a church, by 
participating in the reading of liturgical scripts and singing hymns can act on behalf of the group 
in a manner analogous to a member of a trade union acting on behalf of a group by standing on 
a picket line.  
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Note that these kinds of actions might be performed through acts of shared-agency, such 
as the singing of the liturgical script, but we might also include many other actions as instances 
of playing an active role in a group. Just as organizations need both sub-committees and expert 
individuals to contribute to the actions of the group, the individual actions of neuro-atypical 
individuals could rightly be considered as playing an active role in the actions of the group. We 
will consider this possibility in more detail shortly. In order to act in this way, List and Pettit 
note, individuals ‘must be licensed by the group as being fit to do this, for example, by belonging 
to a suitable category or meeting criterion such as having paid a fee or being accepted by other 
members’ (2010, 35). I assume, in the context of Church worship, what constitutes this kind of 
licensing is the baptism of the individual, in which the Church recognizes that individual as 
belonging to God and belonging to the body of Christ, the Church.  
 We must also consider the issue of group rationality in the context of worship. As List 
and Pettit note, ‘to count as an agent, a group must exhibit at least a modicum of rationality. And 
so its members must find a form of organization that ensures, as far as possible, that the group 
satisfies attitude-to-fact, attitude-to-action, and attitude-to-attitude standards of rationality’ (2010, 
360). It would appear that most churches have the organizational structure to make such a 
decision-making process possible, whether that be through a Parish Council, a board of elders, 
or annual general meetings. Whilst, in worship, we might think very broadly about who or what 
contributes to the actions of the group, it is still important for a church as a group to have some 
kind of structure to reflect on the practice of its members. And thus, whilst a person’s baptism 
might ordinarily be sufficient for them to be considered playing an active role in a church’s 
group worship, there might be cases in which the decision-making processes of the group seek 
to exclude that individual from playing such a role. 
 Finally, before considering the issue of inclusivity and group-agency, it will be helpful to 
refer back to the broader theological picture of the Church to see in what ways church group-
agency differs from other examples of group-agency. As discussed in the opening section, the 
Church as a whole is constituted by many individuals, and many assembled congregations. 
Furthermore, as we saw emphasised in Underhill’s work, the unity of the whole Church is 
something which comes about by the work of God in a way which is somehow mysterious to us. 
She writes that each individual in the Church ‘forms part of a social and spiritual complex with a 
new relation to God; an organism which is quickened and united by that Spirit of supernatural 
charity which sanctifies the human race from above, and is required to incarnate something of 
this supernatural charity in the visible world’ (1936, 83). 
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One way of claiming that the whole Church is engaged in worship through the seemingly 
disparate actions of Church congregations and individuals is to appeal to claim that the whole 
Church has a kind of agency made possible by the work of the Spirit. This seems to fit well with 
the kind of group List and Pettit describe which is structured as an agent but with little or no 
awareness from the members that constitute such a group. In the case of a bee colony or a 
ground level terrorist cell, for instance, there is evidence of agency at the group level, even if not 
at the member level. Such groups can, List and Petit maintain, act on representational and 
motivational states due to the organisational structure of the group, made possible by the 
biological impulses of the bees, or the commands of the terrorist leaders. Now, such a model 
seems helpful for accounting for the agency of the Church as a whole. If, as Underhill claims, the 
Holy Spirit works to unite the members of the Church into forming a whole organism, capable 
of responding to God in worship, then the work of the Spirit might be seen to operate much like 
the biological impulses of the individual bees, or the instructions of higher level terrorist 
commanders. On such a model of the Church’s agency as a whole, we can note that even if there 
is no sense of corporate action involved in gathered worship, or indeed, even if worship is done 
in solitude, the mundane acts of singing, speaking, standing, sitting, and so on, can be united 
together by the work of the Holy Spirit to somehow contribute to the Church as a single group 
agent. As Underhill notes, ‘even [the worshipper’s] most lonely contemplations are not merely 
private matter; but always to be regarded in their relation to the purpose and action of God Who 
incites them, and to the total life of the Church’ (1936, 83). It is important to see that all acts of 
worship, whether by some kind of cooperation or shared-agency, or whether they be the acts of 
those who feel excluded from the worship of the Church, can be seen as part of a wider act of 
worship, made possible by the work of the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the same might be said 
about the gathered church as well as the whole Church; regardless of the human structures which 
enable unity in worship, it is important to recognize that there is a certain kind of divine action 
involved in corporate worship which distinguishes it from other social structures. The Holy 
Spirit unites the actions of a gathered church in worship to provide a kind of supernatural 
agency, even at a congregational level.  
Fully expanding the role of the Holy Spirit in the worship of the Church is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, yet, it is important to say something about what practical 
difference this might make to the worship of gathered church communities. As Bruce Ellis 
Benson (2013) describes, the Holy Spirit can play a practical role in guiding and leading a 
church’s worship. Whilst this might often be thought of as a characteristic only of Pentecostal or 
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Charismatic churches, this need not be the case. As Benson writes, reflecting on his visit to a 
formal liturgical church, ‘Saint Gregory’s’,  
 
In general, members of so-called nonliturgical churches value spontaneity, a feeling of 
being fresh and authentic, since those praying, for example, are speaking from their 
hearts. Conversely “liturgical” churches find the depth and richness of their prayers 
which have been painstakingly written, to be preferable. But these assumptions are 
somewhat misleading. For example, one remarkable thing about the worship service at 
Saint Gregory’s is that it feels so spontaneous. And yet it is actually highly scripted. In 
other words, it achieves what less liturgical churches often hope to achieve—a sense of 
openness, spontaneity, and lack of formality, and the sense that the Holy Spirit is alive 
and guiding the worship. But is does by very closely following a script, one that gets 
modified on the basis of…short meetings after each service. (2013, 140) 
 
As Benson notes, those that lead the liturgy at Saint Gregory’s achieve this responsiveness to the 
Holy Spirit not by an instantaneous spontaneity (although we should not rule out that this might 
be another way of the Holy Spirit guiding worship), but rather, by a regular prayerful reflection 
on the practices of worship. So, whilst the Holy Spirit might play a kind of unseen mysterious 
role in uniting the acts of participants’ worship, there are also practical ways in which a church, 
understood as a group agent, might include and be guided by the directions of the Holy Spirit in 
a way which sets such a group apart from any other social structure.  
 
Group-agency and inclusivity  
Finally, we are now in a position to see how the group-agency model handles cases of non-
paradigm participation in a church’s worship. 
First, it is important to acknowledge that in order for a church to allow for a diverse 
group of individuals to count as being represented by the actions of the wider church 
community, it must have a diverse understanding of membership. If membership is restricted to 
only neuro-typical adults, then the actions of a church in worship will not be inclusive of anyone 
other than neuro-typical adults. For an account of group-agency to be inclusive, the Church 
must actively include those who are often excluded from worship. As Connor, writing about his 
friend Trey, who has learning difficulties, notes, ‘[o]nly the community that denies Trey baptism 
can claim that the learning impairment is his alone not the community’s responsibility’ (2012, 
91).  
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 Secondly, assuming we adopt a diverse understanding of membership, we can see 
straightforwardly how an account of representative action has potential to include individuals 
into the worship of the Church who are not able to actively engage in those practices which 
require some kind of shared-agency. By belonging to a church as a member, a neuro-atypical 
individual can be represented in worship by those who take an active role, even if it is not 
possible for such an individual to take an active role herself. This seems particularlu relevant in 
the case of those with severe neurological impairments and very young infants. Wolterstorff 
(2012) makes a similar point in a political context of the importance of authorized action. He 
writes that, ‘one form of governance of others takes is governance of those who are incapable of 
forming and carrying out a rational plan of action for themselves, small children and the “feeble-
minded” being the best examples. Someone has to govern them in their stead, on their behalf’ 
(2012, 54).24  
 However, whilst this suggestion might provide what Timpe describes as integration, we 
are yet to see how worship might be inclusive in a way which gives rise to Church agency. Indeed, 
it is important to say more about how non-paradigm participants can contribute and engage in 
the church’s worship.25  
Whilst there is clearly much to be said in general about how non-paradigm participants 
can contribute to worship, as with my previous discussion, the focus here will be on how ASD 
individuals can contribute to worship.  It is first important to note here that there are things 
which ASD individuals can contribute to worship which many neuro-typical individuals cannot. 
For instance, many individuals with ASD report to having a kind of heightened spiritual 
perception; Olga Bogdashina describes the experience of ‘simply being’ (2013, 192) which is 
reported by some individuals with ASD, a state of heightened perceptual awareness, and a 
peacefulness of being in the moment. As she goes on to note, this state of being which many 
autistic individuals report, also brings with it a heightened sense of spiritual awareness and an 
openness to certain kinds of religious experience (2013, 197-198). Lamar Hardwick, a pastor who 
was diagnosed with ASD later in life, describes a different kind of spiritual experience which he 
                                                 
24 Additionally, he writes, governance and authorized action is sometimes on behalf of those who 
are capable of ‘forming and carrying out a rational plan of action. Governance in this case 
consists of the combination of someone issuing directives to another person and the recipient 
complying with these directives…to bring about what is judged to be some good’ (2012, 54). 
25 Or, to put this point in another way, we need to see how non-paradigm participants get credit 
for engaging in worship, as an anonymous referee puts it.  
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attributes, in part, to his autism; Hardwick writes that he is able to spend intense periods of time 
studying Scripture and first century history (2017, 114-15). Noticing these differences can help us 
to see individuals with ASD as those who can contribute to the worship of a church community. 
As Conner puts this point,  
 
When we recognize that limitations in some capacities like verbal communication skills 
open up other avenues of discerning God’s presence, then we might be more eager to 
engage other capacities for communing with God and others and for theological insight. 
(2012, 83). 
 
For example, in the case of an individual with ASD who experiences a heightened spiritual 
awareness, such an individual might in turn lead other individuals in the congregation to a 
heightened awareness of the presence of God, and thereby, in turn, contribute to the collective 
actions of the group. It is important to see that just like many other social structures, actions 
which are the result of shared-agency are not the only kind of actions which contribute to the 
actions of a group. Just as an expert reporting to a government department or think tank might 
change the direction and beliefs of the government as a whole in making its members aware of 
something about their environment, certain neuro-atypical individuals might contribute to the 
worship of a church in ways which change the collective direction of a church’s actions in 
worship. Yong (2007), in writing on how our ecclesiology can be renewed by considering the 
role of neuro-atypical individuals, writes that profoundly disabled individuals are able to ‘become 
mentors who are inspired by the Spirit to reshape the gestures of the body of Christ’ (2007, 224). 
Yong argues that if the Church is to be shaped by a Spirit of hospitality, then profoundly 
disabled individuals, who are constituent parts of the Church, have an important role to play in 
shaping the actions and beliefs of the wider body. The Church’s ministry is not merely ‘to’ such 
individuals, Yong notes, but, rather, the Church must minister ‘with’ these individuals (2007, 224) 
as constituent parts of the same whole.  
 Thus, it seems entirely possible that individuals with ASD can and do contribute to 
worship. By considering the church as a group-agent, we are able to not only include non-
paradigm participants, but also, we can see ways in which these individuals can get credit for 
their participation in a church’s acting. In some cases of non-paradigm participation, individuals 
will intend for their worship to be united with the group, despite not being able to coordinate 
their actions in the way required for shared-agency. That is, if the context and culture of a 
particular church is inclusive and informative about non-paradigm participation, then all 
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members of the congregation (including those who cannot form we-intentions) might be 
regarded as contributing an important part of the group’s acting. 
 Yet, there are surely many other cases of non-paradigm participation which are less clear 
than this. The case of very young infants or those with severe ASD would appear to be more 
difficult to account for. Some individuals might not intend or be aware that their actions 
contribute to the group’s acting, so we might wonder, how could such cases count as a part of 
the church’s worship? To see how we might overcome this difficulty, it is important to return to 
the question of the group’s structure and authorization conditions. Just as in the case of a ground 
level terrorist organization, the individuals might not be aware how their actions contribute to 
something wider, or even that they play a contributing role at all, churches can be structured in 
such a way as to authorize the actions of all of those who participate in the church’s worship. 
The decision-making structures (hierarchical bodies, church councils, etc.) referred to in the 
previous section, have a vital role to play in recognizing and licensing the actions of those who 
are neuro-atypical as contributing to the worship of the Church as a group. Yet, if these 
structures or decision-making bodies do authorize individuals to act on behalf of the group, then 
there is no reason why even those who are not able to intentionally contribute, cannot be 
included as part of a church’s group action.   
 As we noted in the previous section, whilst the church has similarities with many other 
cases of group action, one of the key differences lies in the role of the Holy Spirit. In a very 
practical sense, one of the roles of the Holy Spirit in an inclusive worshipping community might 
be to prompt those who are able to shape and direct the worship of the group to find ways of 
including and authorizing the actions of those who are often excluded by other groups in society. 
Whilst this might be through some mysterious, supernatural means, there might also be a 
concrete, practical outworking of the work of the Holy Spirit. Just as Benson reports St. 
Gregory’s as reflecting on their liturgical patterns and submitting to the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit, those who are in positions of authority within a church community might seek the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit in helping them to be aware of how to include non-paradigm 
participants. There is clearly much more to be said on this issue, and this is where the work of 
the analytic theologian ends and reflective practitioners begins.   
 
Conclusion  
As I have stressed throughout, a shared-agency account and a group-agency account of group 
action are seeking to explain different phenomenon. One is not better than the other. Both kinds 
of group action are present in the worship of church congregations. However, it is also 
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important to recognise the limitations of accounts of group action which exclude certain 
individuals from worship. A shared-agency account of group action is limited in what it can 
explain in relation to worship. By considering a church as a group agent, in which a diverse 
group of people can belong as members and contribute to the group’s actions, we have much 
more scope to provide an inclusive model of Church action. As we have seen, such an approach 
to worship is not without its challenges. However, to take seriously the apostle Paul’s command 
that the body of Christ is composed of those who are often seen as dishonourable or 
dispensable, is surely to take seriously the need for an inclusive model of Church action.26 
 
  
                                                 
26 I would like to thank David Efird, Andrew Torrance and Alan Torrance, along with the editor 
and two anonymous referees for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. Many 
thanks to the audience at the Logos Institute seminar at the University of St. Andrews for their 
insightful comments. I am also very grateful to the Templeton Religion Trust for their generous 
funding whilst writing this article.  
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